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ABSTRACT
Whilst European governments have increasingly externalised
restrictive migration policies to civil actors, the latter’s main
interests lie in improving or defending immigrants’ well-being.
This raises the crucial question as to how civil actors deal with the
puzzling position they find themselves in: to what extent do they
execute or transform their funders’ policy objectives? And which
mechanisms enable them to do so? This article contributes to
answering these questions by detailing the historical shifts in the
roles played by civil actors in the Assisted Voluntary Return
programme in Belgium. Most importantly, the article argues that
the considerable autonomy these civil actors achieved resulted in
two seemingly opposite effects. On the one hand, they developed
a wealth of expertise in ensuring the quality of return, thereby
transforming the national government’s goals of managing
migration into humanitarian ones. On the other hand, in recent
developments their autonomy paradoxically became instrumental
to migration management, not so much by changing their
practices or values, but by changing their functioning within the
wider field of migration policies. The article concludes by
proposing the metaphor of ‘immunisation’ as an apt way of
describing civil actors’ practical and functionally role in migration
management.
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Introduction
Throughout the last few decades, European governments have increasingly outsourced the
implementation of theirmigration and integration policies to awide range of external actors
including national and transnational NGOs (Koch 2014), intergovernmental agencies
(Guiraudon and Lahav 2000), private corporations (Scholten 2015), medical staff (Ambro-
sini 2010;Ambrosini andVander Leun 2015) and localwelfare organisations (Vander Leun
2006). By doing so, nation-states seek to circumvent the limits of their sovereign power in
regulating the principally transnational phenomenon of migration. For civil organisations
such asNGOs, however, participating in these state policiesmeans putting themselves into a
fundamentally ambivalent situation, caught between their own imperative to improve
immigrants’ well-being and their funders’ attempts to restrict migration more effectively
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(Ambrosini and Van der Leun 2015; Landy 2015; Van der Leun 2006). A crucial question is
therefore how civil organisations deal with the puzzling position they find themselves in: to
what extent do they merely execute or actually transform their funders’ policy objectives?
And what are the mechanisms enabling them to do so?
One of these externalised components of European migration policies are the pro-
grammes for Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR), in which material and social support is
provided for mainly undocumented immigrants and rejected asylum seekers. Across
Europe, civil actors’ involvement has been crucial to the development of these pro-
grammes, due to their expertise on supporting immigrants and refugees (e.g. Refugee
Action), as well as their transnational networks of partner organisations (e.g. IOM,
Caritas International) (Collyer 2012; Lietaert, Broekaert, and Derluyn 2016; Koch
2014). For these organisations, AVR promises a durable solution to immigrants having
few prospects of local integration or acquiring full legal citizenship (Lietaert, Derluyn,
and Broekaert 2013). Their involvement is nonetheless puzzling, in two respects at the
very least. First, policy-makers financing these programmes explicitly operate in terms
of migration management (moving people out of the territory) and cost-efficiency (as
AVR is cheaper than forced deportation). In this sense, AVR quite clearly functions as
a softer form of ‘state-induced deportation’ (Collyer 2012; Koch 2014), complementing
physically forced deportations (Bloch and Schuster 2005; Coutin 2015). Second, the avail-
able academic evidence on the sustainable character of different types of AVR in terms of
improving subjects’ livelihoods, is mixed at best (Black, Koser, and Munk 2004; Lietaert,
Derluyn, and Broekaert 2013) and simply negative at worst (Schuster and Majidi 2013;
Van Houte, Siegel, and Davids 2014). As a result, civil actors’ main motivation to partici-
pate in AVR is troubled both by the objectives set up by the states funding the pro-
grammes, and by returnees’ actual conditions in their ‘home’ countries.
In exploring the mechanisms underlying civil organisations’ participation in these pro-
grammes, this article details the case of the Belgian AVR programme. In a first section, the
case of AVR is put in the context of wider debates on the role of civil actors in migration
management. After describing the methodological approach, the particular case of civil
actors in the Belgian AVR programme is analysed by concentrating on the changing his-
torical and organisational contexts in which they have operated. By doing so, I identify
three such (national) mechanisms impacting civil actors’ functioning within the pro-
gramme as a whole: political, institutional and cultural factors. More substantially, the
main finding is that the considerable autonomy these civil actors acquired over time,
both enabled them to transform the main goals of the national government funding
their activities, as well as becoming increasingly instrumentalised. To capture the ambiva-
lent effects of this relative autonomy, this article therefore concludes by reflecting on the
conceptual relevance of ‘immunisation’ for understanding civil actors’ role in contempor-
ary European migration policies. The article concludes by reflecting on the conceptual rel-
evance of ‘immunisation’ for understanding the role played by civil actors in
contemporary European migration policies.
From self-limited to externalised sovereignty
Even though discourses on restricting immigration have become increasingly popular
throughout the last few decades, European nation-states’ actual policies have done
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comparably little to either prevent immigration or to carry out deportation as systemati-
cally as their discourses suggest, or as other nation-states have done (e.g. Australia and
Canada). Scholars have accounted for this ‘policy gap’ in several ways (Cornelius and
Tsuda 2004), ranging from external explanations linking the gap to nation-states’
reduced sovereignty in an era of economic, social and cultural globalisation (Boswell,
Geddes, and Scholten 2011; Sassen 1996; Soysal 1994) to internal explanations emphasis-
ing liberal nation-states’ legal and moral reluctance (Joppke 1998) or the role of elite
policy-makers’ preferences (Freeman 1995) in preventing these restrictive discourses
being put into practice. From the late 1990s onwards however, European migration pol-
icies began to rely more extensively on external actors to help ‘manage’ or ‘control’
migration (Geiger and Pécoud 2013; Haddad 2008; Hyndman andMountz 2008). By shift-
ing policy implementation ‘up, down and out’ (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000; Lavenex 2006)
or by governing through ‘networks’ (Hajer and Versteeg 2005; Lavenex, Lehmkuhl, and
Wichmann 2009), European nation-states thus sought to restore part of the sovereign
power they appeared to have lost. In doing so, they relied upon external actors’ specific
expertise (Ellermann 2006), their ability to reach particular groups of (undocumented)
immigrants (Scholten 2015), and the moral legitimacy or credibility to act in more
ambivalent terrains such as physically enforced deportation (Kalir and Wissink 2015).
Amongst the plethora of these externalised policy measures, the following are perhaps
most salient:
(1) establishing inter-governmental initiatives and agencies to guard Europe’s external
borders (e.g. Frontex), and to develop a series of biometric tools to identify undocu-
mented immigrants (Guild and Bigo 2010; Hyndman and Mountz 2008);
(2) fining private actors transporting undocumented immigrants (e.g. airplane compa-
nies, taxi drivers and sea transport) (Guiraudon 2000; Scholten 2015; Scholten and
Minderhoud 2008);
(3) stimulate the effective return of undocumented immigrants and rejected asylum
seekers by developing the European Return Fund, and by investing in bilateral and
multilateral readmission agreements with countries of transit and origin (Cassarino
2007);
(4) financially stimulating social, educational and medical services to exclude undocu-
mented immigrants, to discourage them from staying without residence permits
(Devillé 2008; Van der Leun 2006).
Over the last few years, this externalisation process has fed into the topical question of
how and under which conditions these external actors are able to transform these
migration policies through their own practices and actions, rather than simply executing
the policies of their funders (Lahav and Guiraudon 2006; Landy 2015; Statham and
Geddes 2006). This article concentrates more precisely on ‘civil actors’, which are under-
stood as the range of ‘non-state or non-governmental and non-market actors’, including
NGOs, ‘social movements, religious institutions and trade unions’ (Ambrosini and Van
der Leun 2015).
These civil actors have at least two strategies at their disposal for doing so: first, they can
be allowed to develop a degree of professionalism and expertise which in turn requires
practical autonomy much like specialised bureaucratic agencies (Ellermann 2006;
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Pacquet 2015; Van der Leun 2006), and second, particularly in corporatist-democratic
governing structures, they can be allowed to engage in a more pertinent dialogue on pre-
ferable practices and norm-formation (Hajer and Versteeg 2005). By engaging in strategies
like these, civil actors may thus transform both the objectives and the means of the policies
they are deemed to execute (Ellermann 2006; Lahav and Guiraudon 2006). The crucial
question for our purposes, then, is whether and under which conditions civil actors
within AVR programmes have been able to transform nation-states’ objectives to regulate
migration by stimulating undocumented immigrants and rejected asylum seekers to
return to their countries of origin.
In the remainder of this article, these broader questions on the role of civil actors will be
addressed by concentrating on the specific case of the Belgian programme for AVR. The
main relevance of this particular case is threefold. First, AVR programmes are a particu-
larly relevant locus for examining civil actors’ role in migration policies, given the state’s
intense reliance upon civil actors to execute and engage with these programmes (Lietaert,
Derluyn, and Broekaert 2013). In addition, these programmes potentially bring to the fore
a tension that is crucial for civil actors’ engagement in migration policies more generally:
on the one hand, this involvement allows actors to provide humanitarian assistance
(oriented towards immigrants’ well-being), whereas on the other, it is used as a (state-
oriented) tool to manage migration (Chimni 2004; Lietaert, Broekaert, and Derluyn
2016). Second, Belgium in particular, hosts one of the longest running AVR programmes
in Europe, which allows us to analyse changes in the organisational set-up of the pro-
gramme over time, as well as the mechanisms that led to these changes. Third, the
Belgian AVR programme has been governed through a democratic-corporatist
decision-making structure, in which civil actors are structurally engaged in a mutual dia-
logue from the early stages of the policy-making process, rather than simply being asked to
implement or execute top-down policy-measures. This institutional set-up distinguishes
Belgian migration policies from their more centralised or state-directed counterparts in
other European countries, such as Ireland (Landy 2015), the U.K. (Statham and Geddes
2006) and the Netherlands (Van der Leun 2006).
Methodology
The article makes use of the qualitative method of ‘process tracing’ (Collier 2011) in order
to reconstruct the historical changes in the programme’s organisational set-up, as well as
the emerging policy objectives. Following Lietaert, Broekaert, and Derluyn (2016), I dis-
tinguish between an earlier period in which policy-makers emphasised the humanitarian
component of the programme, and a more recent period emphasising its use for managing
migration. In addition, this article distinguishes between these two periods and an even
earlier one, in which Belgian migration policies were more permissive or ‘self-limited’
(Joppke 1998) in forcing or stimulating undocumented immigrants to leave the national
territory (Devillé 2008). More crucially, rather than detailing political objectives and dis-
courses (Lietaert, Broekaert, and Derluyn 2016), this study’s main focal point is civil
actors’ changing role within these periods, and the factors leading to these changes. In
other words, this article concentrates more on the underlying mechanisms enabling the
AVR programme to become more assistance-oriented at first, before becoming oriented
more towards migration management.
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More precisely, I draw upon two types of qualitative analysis (cf. Koch 2014). On the
one hand, three types of policy documents were analysed. These included, first, policy
reports produced by the civil partners structurally involved in the Belgian AVR pro-
gramme. These included annual reports, evaluations of pilot programmes, and general
policy recommendations. In Belgium, these structural partners included the national
branches of Caritas International, the International Organization for Migration (IOM)
and local well-being services (CAWs). Whilst most scholars conceive of the latter as
local state institutions rather than civil actors (Ambrosini and Van der Leun 2015; Van
der Leun 2006), they are nonetheless understood here as part of civil society, for two
reasons. First, in Belgium, they are commonly seen as part of the ‘societal middle field’
between state and citizens, rather than being part of the state as such. Second, and relat-
edly, even though these organisations are state-sponsored, they are given more practical
autonomy than, for instance, local social services providing social benefits. This is
evident both in the lack of local political control of their work (as compared to local
social services providing benefits, which are governed by elected municipal councils)
and in the establishment of long-term nation-wide contracts (‘convenants’) securing
their autonomy from direct state intervention.
Second, this research analysed the policy reports produced by the governmental
agencies involved in the AVR programme. This included first and foremost the formal
policy notes produced by the elected Ministers or State Secretaries responsible for AVR.
Second, it comprised the year reports by Fedasil, the agency responsible for the integration
and reception of asylum seekers, as well as the coordination of the AVR civil partner
network. And third, the analysis took into account the reports produced by the Immigra-
tion Office, which is responsible for, amongst other things, ensuring that undocumented
immigrants effectively leave the country.
After analysing these policy documents, semi-structured elite interviews (Collier 2011;
Koch 2014) were conducted with senior policy coordinators involved in the AVR pro-
gramme (including both the two civil actors Caritas and IOM, and the governmental
agencies Fedasil and the Immigration Office), so as to deepen the analysis of civil
actors’ roles within the AVR programme. These seven interviews (two with each organis-
ation apart from the Immigration Office) lasted for approximately one hour, with ques-
tions being asked on (a) historical changes in the programme; (b) policy objectives and
strategies to achieve them; and (c) the emergence of potential tensions between providing
humanitarian assistance and managing migration.
Historical shifts in the Belgian AVR programme
1984–1998: permissive, self-limited sovereignty
The Belgian AVR programme was launched in 1984, five years after Germany launched the
first such programme in Europe (IOM 2012). From the very beginning AVR was housed
within the Ministry of Social Affairs (responsible for poverty and integration) rather than
the Home Office (responsible for immigration and border control), as is usually the case
in other European member states (EMN 2009). In addition, AVR was continuously gov-
erned by aMinister of either social-democratic or Christian-democratic parties. The impli-
cation of this institutional set-up was twofold. First, AVR’s main objectives were set in
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humanitarian, rather than restrictive or bio-political terms. The programme, that is, seemed
structurally designed to facilitate rather than force return migration. Throughout this early
period the support it provided was relatively modest: it covered transportation costs and a
small additional lump sum of approximately 250 euros (EMN 2009). The AVR programme
was thus designed not so much to convince people to return by providing actual incentives,
but rather to support the return of those who already wanted to return but lacked themeans
to do so. And from a different perspective, the programme did not attempt to force people
either, as no follow-up systemhadbeen establishedmakingdeportation a real threat to those
not returning voluntarily. This facilitating, comparably liberal approachwas reflected in the
small number of people actually making use of the programme up until the mid to late
1990s, rising steadily from 100 to 900 over a period of 14 years (EMN 2009). In the
words of a senior IOMofficer, the AVR programmewas considered ‘not only as amigration
management project, but as a humanitarian project as well’.
A second implication of the institutional set-up is that the programme was pertinently
embedded within a corporatist-democratic decision-making structure, which entails a
close and intense involvement of civil organisations from the early stages of policy-
making to the actual implementation. On the one hand, the programme relied upon trans-
national organisations’ international network of partner organisations and local branches
to organise and execute the logistical support for those who wanted to return but lacked
the most basic means of doing so (cf. Koch 2014). In both the Belgian and German AVR
programmes, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) was called upon to
undertake this mainly logistical endeavour, which was fully in line with IOM’s focus on
facilitating and naturalising the process of international migration.
On the other hand, IOM coordinates a network of local civil partner organisations
which slowly expanded throughout the years. This network consists mostly of local gov-
ernmental and non-governmental well-being services, the latter often with either a Chris-
tian or socialist background. Their task entailed not so much assisting people to return
after they had decided to do so (as IOM did) but rather reaching out to potential returnees
and informing them of the modalities of the programme. For these organisations, the key
rationale behind participating in the programme was – and still is – that AVR is one of the
few potentially durable solutions for subjects having little prospect of acquiring permanent
legal residence. Informing their clients on the logistical support for return migration, that
is, potentially works to the benefit of these clients’ well-being.
1998–2008: growth, development and professionalisation
The late 1990s saw a growing interest in voluntary repatriation; this was at least partly due
to the increasingly violent conflicts in former Yugoslavia, which led several hundred thou-
sand people to seek refuge in North and West Europe. After a while most of these refugees
received a humanitarian status granting them residence and protection for as long as the
unrest lasted. When the worst part of the storm had passed, however, only a small share
actually returned, leading several governments to set up a range of ad hoc measures
(Walsh, Black, and Koser 1999). In this sense, European governments distributed rather
large amounts of money for returnees to rebuild their houses and their lives. Similarly,
the Belgian government cooperated with IOM to provide assistance and support in
re-building refugees’ lives in their country of origin.1 These initiatives thus embodied a
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substantial shift in the rationale of the AVR programme: from facilitating return to pro-
actively convincing or inducing people to return through providing financial incentives.
Consequently, these ad hoc projects led to rising numbers of people effectively making
use of the AVR programme: between 1998 and 2001, the total amount of returnees
more than tripled, from 1166 in 1998 to 3546 in 2001 (EMN 2009).
Subsequently, some additional ad hoc projects were launched by both IOM and Bel-
gium’s Immigration Office, endowed with the task of regulating migration to and from
Belgian territory. These projects were designed to target particular groups representing
a high share of undocumented immigrants, such as Moroccan and Angolan immigrants.
These ad hoc projects’ main goal was thereby to identify the precise obstacles to these
persons returning, and to develop projects to help overcome these constraints, for
example, by providing support for local job-placement.2
In a different vein, the early 2000s saw the launch of the European Refugee Funds,
which emerged through a series of treaties and Joint Actions (Thielemann 2005). This
fund focused its attention on ‘asylum’ and ‘refugees’ rights, instead of, for instance, immi-
gration or border control. More precisely, the initial proposal for the fund explicitly
referred to voluntary return as a programme to the advantage of returnees, rather than
an instrument for managing migration (European Commission 1999). More relevant to
our purposes, however, is how this fund impacted the Belgian AVR programme. In prac-
tice, the fund provided budgets to experiment through a number of pilot projects drawing
on the expertise developed by the ad hoc initiatives to induce former-Yugoslavian refugees
to return. Several civil actors participated in these actions between 2002 and 2008, the
most important being IOM, Caritas (whose local services had been part of the AVR
civil network from the very beginning), Refugee Action Flanders (Vluchtelingenwerk
Vlaanderen) and Ciré. As intended by the European Refugee Fund, these pilot projects
effectively worked to improve organisations’ overall capacities in improving the sustain-
ability or durability of return migration for particular groups of immigrants.
More precisely, these civil actors developed a general expertise and know-how in pre-
and post-departure counselling by monitoring re-integration processes (this is done for-
mally 1, 3 and 12 months after arrival), continuously receiving feedback from local
partner organisations in return countries, and by organising ‘return missions’ during
which NGO staff would visit returnees (e.g. Lietaert, Broekaert, and Derluyn 2013).
More specific skills were developed by concentrating on particular countries and
regions (e.g. local labour markets; political, religious and ethnic contexts), as well as by
specialising in programmes designed to improve returnees’ social and economic liveli-
hoods (e.g. job placement, micro-businesses, social support through relatives and other
networks). And lastly, these civil actors broadened and deepened their international net-
works with local partner organisations (e.g. by engaging with partners in different cities,
rather than merely the capitals), both on a daily basis and through setting up a series of
international conferences, workshops and seminars.
The net result of these EU-funded pilot projects, thus seemed to be the development
and professionalisation of the humanitarian dimension of the Belgian AVR programme.
Arguably, this humanitarian expertise led the programme to gain legitimacy and credi-
bility in the eyes of street-level bureaucrats and their organisations (e.g. local well-being
services). According to both the professional civil actors working for IOM and Caritas
and the street-level bureaucrats that were interviewed for this research, the initial
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‘resistance’ to AVR was gradually overcome precisely because of these reasons. The credi-
bility of the AVR programme as a whole was thus dependent upon civil actors’ ability to
ensure the durable character of return.
These efforts to render AVR more sustainable for returnees were ultimately reliant on
the EU’s financial support. Whilst the first European Refugee Fund (2000–2004) financed
many pilot projects, the second (2005–2010) rendered this support more structural. Most
importantly, 2006 saw an EU-driven expansion of the support programme itself: from
then on, subjects belonging to vulnerable categories such as medical patients or pregnant
women would receive up to 1400 euros – later raised to 1500 – per person, in addition to
the maximum of 700 euros provided through national funds (EMN 2009). On the whole,
these programmes were continued later on through the European Return Fund (2008–
2013) and the Asylum and Migration Fund (2014–2020).
The governmental agency responsible for coordinating and selecting these projects has
always been Fedasil. Ever since its establishment in May 2002, Fedasil’s main responsibility
has consisted of organising and coordinating the reception facilities for asylum seekers
(e.g. ‘open’ reception centres). In contrast to most European ministries, as we noted
earlier, these tasks were originally subsumed under a Ministry of Social Affairs, instead
of an Immigration Office. In addition, during the first two legislatures since Fedasil’s
establishment, these ministries were ruled by social-democratic Ministers or State Sec-
retaries. This institutional and political set-up allowed Fedasil to develop an organisational
culture distinguishing them from governmental agencies endowed with comparable tasks
in other liberal nation-states (e.g. the NASS in the U.K.). That is, rather than seeing them-
selves as regulating a population by guarding its entry points (Guild and Bigo 2010) or
spatially dispersing asylum seekers (Darling 2011), Fedasil traditionally pledges to pay
close attention to the interests of the latter: ‘Our main goal is always the well-being of
people, that’s it, there’s nothing more to it.’3
Fedasil’s institutional and cultural autonomy was crucial for the development and
nature of the Belgian AVR programme, as it took up a central role within the latter.
Most importantly, Fedasil set-up a dialogue-centred working structure, allowing NGOs
to develop their work in the area of humanitarian or social support. To this purpose,
Fedasil, IOM and Caritas join in structural meetings every 3 months, and perhaps more
importantly, IOM and Caritas are party to long-term ‘convenants’ (cooperation contracts)
designating them as the two sole partners responsible for organising pre-departure coun-
selling and (through their international networks) post-departure re-integration assist-
ance. Perhaps hardly surprisingly, these pertinent efforts and commitments made by
Fedasil were particularly applauded by Caritas and IOM staff members, who repeatedly
expressed their satisfaction with Fedasil’s open attitude to discussion and debate on all
sorts of matters. Even though the power asymmetries in this funder–recipient relationship
are obvious, this cooperation-based set-up distinguishes the Belgian situation from similar
programmes in the U.K. and the Netherlands (EMN 2009). The latter operate much more
through a centralist logic, outsourcing part of their policies to civil partners which are
selected and rejected over time, through short or medium term contracts. In this sense,
it bears repeating that the Belgian AVR programme was rooted in the corporatist-demo-
cratic decision-making structure characteristic of the Belgian political system as a whole.
To conclude, in this period of humanitarian professionalisation, civil actors were able to
develop their own values, practices and objectives, which were centred around the
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humanitarian goal of improving subjects’ well-being, rather than forcing or convincing
them to leave the territory. This nurturing of the humanitarian dimension of the pro-
gramme can be metaphorically described as a form of ‘immunisation’ from the values,
practices and subject definitions through which nation-states operate (Vandevoordt
2016). By developing a humanitarian professionalism or expertise, civil actors were thus
able to shift the AVR programme’s outlook and the techniques it relied upon from
serving the goal of maintaining the state’s sovereignty to improving the sustainability or
durability of return. This was possible due to a combination of political factors (the pro-
gramme being placed either under Social-democratic or Christian-democratic policy-
makers), institutional factors (Fedasil rather than the Immigration Office was designated
as the government agency responsible, and coordinated the civil partner network in a cor-
porate-democratic dialogue, rather than operating through state-centred top-down
implementation) and cultural factors (with civil actors redirecting the objectives and prac-
tices to bring them into line with their own organisational values).
Consequently, in this period AVR was tied up primarily with improving the quality of
return, rather than raising the number of actual returnees. This seems to be reflected in the
figures: the number of returnees stabilised at between 2500 and 3500 between 2002 and
2008, except for a single outlier in 2005, a year when Brazilian labour migrants began
using the programme to support circular migration (EMN 2009). In this regard it is
worth mentioning that there is little or no cooperation between these humanitarian
actors and the Immigration Office – except for IOM, whose main focus remains tied
more closely to logistically facilitating migration rather than serving individual well-
being. Similarly, on a cultural level, Fedasil, IOM and Caritas employees continuously
drew symbolic boundaries between themselves on the one hand, and the Immigration
Office and police agents on the other.
2008–present: ‘voluntary if possible, forced if necessary’
From 2008 onwards, a number of political and institutional changes took place, which did
less to change the substance of the AVR programme, than to alter its effective functioning
within the nation-state’s overall policy goals. On a political level, AVR increasingly rose to
prominence on the political agenda, with AVR becoming the chief responsibility of liberal,
rather than social-democratic or Christian politicians. On an institutional level, migration
and asylum (including the AVR programme) were for the first time merged under a single
Ministry and a single State Secretary. In practice, this double shift meant that voluntary
return became more fully part of a migration management discourse, rather than a huma-
nitarian one: the AVR programme’s usefulness was described primarily as serving a
‘humane warning’ before proceeding to more forcible deportation measures. The key
emphasis thereby came to lie upon the inevitability of return, crystallised in the central
slogan ‘voluntary if possible, forced if necessary’ (Turtelboom 2008). The programme
was increasingly seen as part of the ‘battle against illegal migration’, whereby ‘an effective
return and deportation policy’ was deemed a necessary breech to a consistent stance on
asylum (Turtelboom 2008).
Subsequently, these asylum and migration policies were developed further under Mel-
chior Wathelet’s (2009–2010) and especially Maggie De Block’s (2011–2013) brief periods
as State Secretaries, although it was only under the latter’s rule that (voluntary) return
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really became a corner stone of the asylum and migration policy as a whole. De Block took
office during one of the fiercest reception crises Belgium had ever seen, in which thousands
of registered asylum seekers were left without a place to sleep, a development breaching
Belgian law. Most of her policy measures were accordingly designed to counter this recep-
tion crisis (2011). Besides ad hoc measures to increase emergency reception centres, this
resulted in a more structural attempt to limit incoming flows of applicants and to maxi-
mise the numbers of rejected asylum seekers leaving the territory, as these were perceived
as putting a strain on local social services and the housing market. Building on the direc-
tion taken by her predecessors Turtelboom and Wathelet, De Block’s policy notes thus
devoted considerable attention to measures that were ‘stimulating return’ (2011).
Most importantly for the functioning of the AVR programme was the establishment, in
the late spring of 2011, of Sefor: an Immigration Office service endowed with the double
task of informing immigrants on the support offered by the AVR programme, and of ‘fol-
lowing-up’ and effectively expelling those who received an ‘Order to Leave the Territory’
(OLT). When asylum seekers, for instance, receive a negative decision on their application,
they are invited into the local Immigration Office where they are informed of the OLT and
the modalities of the AVR programme. If they do not sign up for AVR – which, up until
now, only a handful of immigrants have effectively done immediately after being informed
of their OLT – they are contacted again and possibly arrested by the police by order of
Sefor. The launch of this ‘service’ proved to be a landmark in Belgian migration policy,
as it meant that for the first time, OLTs were actually followed up and carried out – in
contrast to the country’s earlier passive tolerance towards undocumented immigrants
(Devillé 2008). In the interviews, Immigration Officers claimed that the sudden rise in
voluntary return was a direct consequence of the launch of Sefor, as it increased
people’s fear of forced deportation. At least at first sight, the figures do seem evident
enough (Fedasil 2015): in 2010 only 2957 people returned, which rose to 3358 in 2011
and to 5656 in 2012, before falling again to 4585 in 2013 and 3587 in 2014 (which was
due to the exclusion of Brazilian and former Yugoslavian nationals, who increasingly
used the programme for going back and forth in search of work).4
In addition to following up OLTs, the Immigration Office began to cooperate more
intensively with urban governments to target their actions at particular ‘trouble groups’
such as undocumented Moroccans with criminal records. This ‘shifting down’ (Guiraudon
and Lahav 2000) of return policies also meant that Immigration Officers increasingly
turned towards small-scale migrant organisations to reach the targeted groups – a strategy
they copied from the Dutch city of Utrecht.5 In this vein, they cooperated with Moroccan
and Polish migrant organisations in order to make return more worthwhile – whether
voluntary or forced – for instance by investing in strategic job placement in these
return countries. In this sense, the Immigration Office increasingly focused on pro-actively
stimulating (voluntary) return, in line with top-down policy preferences. In addition, it
should be noted that whilst official policy documents are explicitly rooted in a discourse
of restoring the ‘national order’ (Malkki 1995) by relocating individuals to the state in
which they originally ‘belong’, some of these targeting measures do seem to hint at
popular discourses with more substantial ethnic, sometimes even racial undertones. In
Belgium, as in other West-European nation-states, North-African, for instance, are
often associated with all kinds of behaviour that is deemed problematic (criminality,
welfare abuse and absence of residence documents). In practice, explicitly targeting
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these specific groups for voluntary return therefore potentially feeds into popular dis-
courses on belonging and otherness.
Fedasil, in turn, increasingly concentrated on what is called the ‘return trajectory’. This
means that asylum applicants are informed of the modalities of the AVR programme at
fixed stages throughout their procedure: registration at the Immigration Office, the
intake conversation at the reception centre, 5 and 20 days after their first day of residence
in the asylum centre, and possibly again when they are informed of a negative decision.
These elaborate talks were accompanied by ubiquitous posters hanging around the
asylum centres (‘Thinking of Home?’ written above a packed bag) and brochures being
handed out at intake conversations. The aim of this trajectory was to make people
aware of the possibility of returning voluntarily even before their application was effec-
tively denied. By informing them in the early phases of the programme, applicants
would be expected to come to a decision of their own when their claim was turned down.
In addition, Fedasil began taking more and more control over parts of the AVR pro-
gramme, which initially belonged to the civil partners – in spite of clearly respecting
their reliance on these civil organisations for reaching potential returnees.6 This was
done partly by establishing ‘return offices’ in Belgium’s biggest cities, that were continu-
ously available to quickly process and register immigrants who had decided to return
voluntarily (after which they are referred to IOM or Caritas for considerable coaching).
In addition, Fedasil began to work together more closely with local municipalities and
their welfare services. In some cases, this was limited to organising a number of workshops
or staff training on AVR, whilst in other cases, this resulted in a Fedasil employee being
taken on by the municipal welfare service. Whilst the Immigration Office thus became
more and more involved in voluntary return, Fedasil increasingly invested in pro-actively
informing future undocumented immigrants (rejected asylum seekers) on the possibility
of AVR. In other words, the political changes (the establishment of right-wing, liberal gov-
ernments and State Secretaries instead of corporatist-democratic, leftist governments)
were translated into a series of institutional changes, as the Immigration Office increas-
ingly concentrated on voluntary return as a whole and on cooperating with local govern-
ments in particular, whilst Fedasil increased its focus on a particular type of immigrants in
the process of becoming undocumented.
In the meantime however, Caritas and IOM continued working as they had before, both
through the everyday assistance they offered, and by engaging in new short-term projects to
increase their expertise and expand their local-international networks. Asked what their
aspirations were for the near future, one Caritas employee responded, in tune with her
IOM colleagues: ‘If we can just continue doing and developing further what we have
been doing up till now, that would already be a great accomplishment in itself.’7 In spite
of the rising prevalence of migration management discourses in AVR, there was thus
little sign of a shift in policy goals or means within these humanitarian organisations, as
they kept a strong emphasis on improving the quality of voluntary return. Furthermore,
their structural dialogue and cooperation with Fedasil continued with the same degree of
cooperation, in spite of the right-wing liberal government’s more restrictive stance
towards civil organisations. Fedasil’s perceived reliability led several NGO employees to
express their satisfaction as to Fedasil’s vital role in AVR vis-à-vis the Immigration
Office.8 Fedasil, that is, was deemed able to enlarge the component of voluntary over
forced return in the government’s implemented policy practices, as opposed to the latter’s
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twofold objective of minimising the number of immigrants and maximising the number of
effective returnees. In spite of their asymmetrical power relationship, these humanitarian
organisations and Fedasil thus continued to perceive themselves as allies on either side of
the border between civil society and government – rather than competitors or challengers.
Rather than changing the substance or content of how these organisations work, the
Belgian government thus altered the policies surrounding AVR. As we saw in the previous
paragraphs, the Immigration Office and Fedasil launched a series of measures intended to
target ‘trouble-making’ groups, such as systematically following up undocumented immi-
grants, and informing potential future returnees as early as possible as to the merits and
modalities of AVR. The ability of Caritas, IOM and the street-level AVR network to retain
their emphasis on the subjects’ well-being amidst a changing political and institutional
context was made possible only by their institutional position in the ‘second line’ of the
AVR chain. That is, what changed were not so much their practices, values and discourses
but the legal-political conditions in which these practices took place. These civil-humani-
tarian actors continued their pragmatic, expertise-driven work in supporting the re-inte-
gration of returnees, attempting to turn it into a lasting solution as much as they could. At
the same time, however, more and more people were driven towards their assistance by the
increased activities of the Immigration Office in following up and convincing denizens to
return, and Fedasil’s more pro-active role in informing asylum seekers on AVR.
The humanitarian sphere through which these organisations operated was thus not
changed from the inside, but rather, its function shifted through a change in the broader
configuration of spheres in its external environment. These civil actors were, in other
words, perfectly allowed to fulfil their job according to their own values, even though
they began to function more and more within a wider strategy of expelling undocumented
immigrants. In other words, the precise meaning and implication of civil partners’ ‘immu-
nisation’ from these legal-political structures changed quite substantively. Whilst humani-
tarian practices and perspectives remained immunised from the objectives of migration
management, their effective ‘function’ increasingly shifted towards facilitating and legiti-
mating the effective return of rejected asylum seekers and undocumented immigrants
(cf. Castaneda 2007). At first, this immunity allowed civil actors to maintain their values
and objectives by developing professional expertise, whilst in the last period, this relative
autonomy was increasingly utilised to strengthen a policy bent on managing migration.
A clear example of this logic was when both current State Secretary Theo Francken and
Fedasil proudly announced a sudden increase in Iraqi participants in the AVR programme
in October 2015 (Fedasil 2015). What preceded this proud expression of the AVR’s appar-
ent success was a decision taken just a few weeks before. In response to the sudden rise in
asylum applicants in August and September of 2015, Francken and the responsible gov-
ernment agency (the Commissariat-General for Refugees and the Stateless) decided to
temporarily ‘freeze’ Iraqi applications, before substantially lowering their acceptance
rates. In addition, an informal communication campaign was launched informing Iraqis
not to come to Belgium. In anticipation of and response to this changing policy, many
newly arrived Iraqi asylum seekers refrained from applying, with some disappearing
into illegality, whilst others made use of the AVR programme to return. In this sense,
what changed was not so much Fedasil’s stance on the ‘voluntariness’ of AVR, nor was
it IOM’s or Caritas’ focus on making return more sustainable as a whole, but rather the
legal-political conditions causing the subjects to take up these programmes.
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Concluding remarks: on ‘immunisation’
We began this article by noting that European nation-states have increasingly sought to
externalise their migration policies to a wide range of actors. One of the more topical ques-
tions emerging from recent scholarship is whether and how civil actors are able to trans-
form the objectives and practices set by the government funding them.
As an empirical contribution in response to this question, this article analysed the
history of the role of civil actors in the Belgian AVR programme. We noted that NGOs
were initially able to transform the main objectives of migration policies by prioritising
the humanitarian rationale, before being used as a tool to serve the government’s objec-
tives of maximising the number of actual returns. Their initial ability to develop the huma-
nitarian aspect was made possible by three mechanisms. First, politically the AVR
programme as a whole was embedded within departments ruled by social-democratic
or Christian-democratic politicians, who granted these civil actors considerable autonomy
in setting their own priorities and expressing their voices in internal dialogue. Second, the
institutional set-up, which separated AVR from the Immigration Office, consolidated a
civil partner-driven decision-making structure which partly outlived the political
changes. In this sense, Fedasil’s cooperative coordinating style and its emphasis on
‘durable’ return was retained even in the face of a political climate bent on using voluntary
return as a precursor for forced deportation. Precisely this set-up is what distinguishes
Belgian migration policies more generally from its counterparts in Ireland (Landy
2015), the U.K. (Statham and Geddes 2006) and the Netherlands (Van der Leun 2006).
Third, Caritas, IOM and the local social well-being services relied upon their cultural-
organisational values to structure how they implemented these policies. In this sense,
Caritas relied intensely upon prioritising individual well-being, whereas IOM showed a
facilitating attitude towards migration as a natural process.
One of the ways in which these factors can be captured more theoretically, I argue, is
through the concept of ‘immunisation’. The reason why external actors are expected to
implement state policies more effectively than the state’s own institutions is precisely
because the former rely on a distinct, relatively autonomous ensemble of practices, per-
spectives, knowledges, values and objectives. Making use of these external actors, then,
is dependent and conditional upon granting them at least a minimal degree of autonomy.
Arguably, the same process would take place when outsourcing policies to G4S as much as
to humanitarian actors.
The main effect of this organisational immunisation is thus twofold. On the one hand,
immunisation allowed the transformation of the norms and values of the initially intended
policy, in a shift from migration management to a distinct (humanitarian) sphere. That is,
the primary criterion used to assess whether AVR ‘works’ is its effectiveness in improving
the sustainability or durability of voluntary return, rather than raising the number of
actual returnees. Developing their expertise thus led these external actors – at least for a
particular period – to effectively push the programme’s humanitarian component to the
forefront. On the other hand, however, from 2008 onwards this process of ‘immunisation’
equally enabled these external actors to become instruments within the government’s
primary objective of managing migration. This shift took place by altering the external
configuration in which these civil actors operate, rather than by substantially changing
how they do so. By developing a specific (in this case humanitarian) expertise or
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professionalism, civil actors were able to expand the operational modalities of the AVR
programme. By investing in pilot projects led by humanitarian actors relying on local
expertise, international networks, and intense trust relationships vis-à-vis immigrants,
voluntary return was turned into an increasingly viable possibility for undocumented
immigrants and rejected asylum seekers. Over time however, this ‘space of autonomy’
(Ambrosini and Van der Leun 2015) worked both ways: whilst it allowed civil actors to
change the government’s main objectives and practices at first, it eventually helped to
facilitate a change in their overall functioning within the management of migration.
Notes
1. Based on two separate Interviews with an IOM employee and an Immigration Officer.
2. Interview with an Immigration Officer.
3. Interview with a Fedasil employee.
4. However, these interpretations were contested by IOM and Fedasil employees, who noted
that the sudden rise was largely due to the exceptionally large number of (rejected) asylum
applications throughout the two preceding years. The programme’s contribution to these
rising numbers, according to them, was its simple availability.
5. Interview with an Immigration Officer.
6. Interview with a Fedasil employee.
7. Interview with a Caritas employee.
8. Interviews with Caritas and IOM employees.
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